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Leadership and Command on the Battlefield

Battalion and Company

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

DESERT STORM

JUST CAUSE

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-100-2
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-100-2

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

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Fort Monroe, Virginia

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

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Commander's Intent...

Capture how successful battlefield commanders at battalion and company—the echelons of command that engage in direct combat with the enemy—commanded their units in combat. Identify commonalities in battle command used at these echelons during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

Through the interview process, find out how they issued intent and orders during combat, where they positioned themselves on the battlefield, and how they controlled and distributed fires. Question them on other insights that facilitated their ability to command and lead their units to victory at least cost to their soldiers during battle.

Distill the findings, publish them, and distribute to the field. Success rests on the ability to distribute a concise, readable, and useful pamphlet on command and leadership in battle that assists current and future combat leaders.



GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
Commander, TRADOC

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Introduction

This is the second pamphlet on the art of battle command. The first concerned how corps, division, and brigade commanders got battalions to the right place at the right time and in the right combinations. This pamphlet is about how commanders of battalions and companies took the fight to the enemy with their soldiers in direct fire combat. It is at this tactical echelon where the tough, hard, uncompromising fighting happens that brings victory at least cost to American soldiers.

GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
Commander, TRADOC

This is the second in a series of five pamphlets intended to capture the battle command successes of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. The first pamphlet focused on commonalities and trends of successful battlefield commanders at brigade, division, and corps. This pamphlet examines these same issues through the lenses of battalion and company commanders.

JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM demonstrated a trained and ready Army, armed with effective weapons, conducting operations in accordance with current doctrine. The accomplishments of both operations resulted in great part from twenty years of introspection and thought which generated AirLand Battle doctrine, the doctrine embodied in FM 100-5, *Operations,* and FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*. Further, the early 1980s were characterized by a defense build-up and the Army's procurement of the "Big Five" weapons systems. The procurement included the Abrams Main Battle Tank, the Bradley, the Patriot Missile System, the Apache Attack Helicopter, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System, each contributing to the success of DESERT STORM and the Apache in JUST CAUSE. Two decades of intense preparation for war against the Soviet Union contributed to the stunning victories in Panama and the Persian Gulf.

As in the first pamphlet, the information for this pamphlet was gained through oral history interviews from battlefield commanders of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. A total of forty-one interviews

were conducted, twenty-four from battalion commanders, and seventeen from company commanders. All commanders answered the same series of questions, all directly related to their preparation for combat and their wartime experiences. Appendixes C and D list the questions asked and the commanders interviewed.

Questions focused on leadership and command techniques. What characteristics of command did successful commanders have in common? What are we doing right in our training and doctrine processes? What mistakes were made in preparation for combat or on the battlefield? This pamphlet reflects the views of the commanders interviewed about what worked and what didn't work for them.

The key for the Army of the future, operating against as yet unknown threats and with limited resources, is to maintain the technical, tactical, and operational edge. The findings in this pamphlet illuminate recent success and suggest some ways in which the Army can maintain the edge in training and leader development. Sustaining the excellence demonstrated in Panama and the Persian Gulf will be one of the key challenges which the Army must confront in the future.

Prologue

To lay the foundation for understanding the battalion and company command response, we interviewed **Major General Thomas G. Rhame,** Commander, 1st Infantry Division during DESERT STORM, to provide a base perspective of the responsibilities of battalion and company commanders during training and in the conduct of warfighting. Conditions in the 1st Infantry Division are representative of those in the Army at large. Accordingly, Major General Rhame's training strategy and expectations are indicative of the approach division commanders in the Army may have taken.

How did the 1st Infantry Division train battalions?

"In all training situations, a commander must communicate effectively and often with battalion commanders, so that in peace or war, the battalion commander has confidence that he understands the division commander's intent. Further, all commanders must understand that everything is negotiable in training except standards. In the 1st Infantry Division, the battalion commander's training requirements were focused on proficiency and execution of the collective training mission. The battalion commander focused on training proficient platoons and companies. Brigade commanders focused on training proficient companies. The division commander focused on training effective battalions. During Battle Command Training Program exercises and III Corps map exercises, we focused hard on training the division commander, the brigade commanders, and their staffs.

Training at battalion level and below focused on maneuver, gunnery, and sustainment. Maneuver concentrated on producing companies and platoons that could arrive and fight at the right place at the right time in the right combination of forces. Gunnery encompassed proficiency of collective systems, crew proficiency, and individual proficiency. Sustainment meant keeping the unit combat effective with logistics systems in place to enable the unit to continue the fight. In preparing for war, the battalion commander must address gunnery and sustainment with the same gusto as maneuver. If a battalion is not proficient with platoon gunnery and cannot execute volley fire, it will not defeat the enemy. If a battalion cannot sustain

itself over three or four days of constant moving and fighting, it will cease to be an effective fighting unit.

At Ft Riley, battalion commanders were required to produce tank and Bradley platoons that successfully completed a Table XII, modified to fit the National Training Center (NTC) requirement. Further, those platoons and crews had to meet the standard of the number of rounds allocated with percentage of targets destroyed on a platoon collective engagement. The course fired, called, "Platoon Kills Battalion," required high skills in platoon fire commands, fire distribution, and ammunition management to meet the standard. This modified gunnery course produced great success at the NTC and later proved optimum for destroying Iraqi armor units.

The Division's maneuver training model required battalion commanders to take platoons through training stakes or lanes and evaluate their proficiency with maneuver, gunnery, and sustainment. The brigade commander's challenge became running the companies through their stakes or lanes. The Division then led the battalions through an opposing force exercise called the "Gauntlet." In the Gauntlet, we emulated NTC conditions as closely as possible.

In preparing units for stakes training and evaluation, and to meet the sustainment requirements, battalion commanders had to maximize the use of simulations. There were standards and gates which had to be met with UCOFT, ARTBASS, SIMNET, and the Battalion Brigade Simulation exercise. We challenged commanders to focus on what it took to sustain proficiency, or what we called, "maintaining the edge." We held the same standards for gunnery, maneuver, and sustainment regardless of the training cycle.

The Division's training concept underlined the requirement for on-going leader development training with officers and noncommissioned officers. It is the division and brigade commanders' sacred responsibility to provide battalions the resources, the opportunity, and the time to train. Commanders must foster a climate of command that produces hard, tough, successful training and sustainment. The Army's leadership development model has produced officers and noncommissioned officers that want to train and will conduct training if they are given the opportunity to do so. The 1st Infantry Division's model stemmed from FM 25-100 and FM 25-101. We didn't create new standards. Standards are already clearly specified by the Army in our training manuals."

In combat, what did you expect from battalion commanders and what did you hold them accountable for?

"The key to success for battalions as they deployed into theater was making the transition from a training environment to preparation for combat. Battalion commanders must have the brigade and division commanders' intent firmly etched in their minds and know generally the concept of operations for any combat mission. If they do not understand this from the start, they are in trouble. Battalion commanders were required to focus on the synchronization of combat resources, to rehearse at every opportunity from platoon through battalion, to be aggressive, and to position themselves forward to see and read the battlefield.

During the preparation for combat, battalion commanders had to pay close attention to the logistics of the operation. If the logistics are not worked out prior to combat, the unit will cease to be combat effective after a very short period of time.

Battalion commanders were held accountable for successful synchronization, successful accomplishment of the mission with least cost to soldiers lives, and to plan for success. Commanders at all levels must visualize beyond their assigned objective and must have a plan, or sequel, for follow-on operations. Commanders must plan for success. The tempo of operations during combat doesn't allow commanders time to work through the full cycle of the orders process. They will never get to the next line of departure if they haven't already planned for success and maintained a balanced stance or posture to continue combat operations.

Battalion commanders must believe that they have the trust and confidence of the brigade and division commanders. They cannot waste time second-guessing their decisions and worrying about whether they are meeting their commander's intent. This goes back to what I said earlier about communications. There has to be an open line of communication, up and down, at all levels of command. Commanders must have the ability to listen as well as the ability to dictate because subordinates have things to say which are pertinent. This openness creates a climate of trust, both from the commander to his subordinate, and from the subordinate to his commander.

An example of the importance of creating a climate of trust and communicating intent clearly occurred when LTC Robert Wilson, Commander, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, the divisional cavalry unit,

lost communications with the rest of the division toward the end of DESERT STORM. In the absence of orders, he accomplished the mission of blocking the highway near the coast in Kuwait." [See vignette on page 7] "The last thing on Bobby Wilson's mind, as he made tactical decisions on the battlefield to meet my intent, was that I was going to scream and holler at him or ruin his career for using initiative and aggressive leadership. It should be the goal of every commander to create this degree of trust within his unit.

The key to the business of warfighting and preparing leaders for war is leader development. It overshadows everything we do. Leader development programs must be successful if we are to continue to put professionally trained forces in the field prepared for combat. Everyone in the chain of command must be involved in leader development. Leader development has to be more than something you just talk about and hold briefings on. It has to be something that you can see, feel, measure, and touch."

MG Rhame's philosophy and model for training and preparation for combat are his own and reflect his personal views and the conditions at Fort Riley. Significantly, his views reflect doctrine and demonstrate that he, like his peers in other divisions of the Army, trained to standard. Thus, the experiences of battalion and company commanders in the 1st Infantry Division as they trained and prepared for war are not dissimilar from their counterparts. Clearly, battle focus and the training tools available to commanders are essential to the training and leader development system which produced victory in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

Chapter 1

Preparation for Combat

The most significant combat multipliers are teamwork and cohesion. [In Operation DESERT STORM] we understood how each other worked. In the eight months we had together, we formed a cohesive team. The result was that we understood the orders passed in times of crisis. We were familiar, and that comes from the word "family."

LTC Pat Ritter
Cdr, 1-34 Ar, 1st Bde, 1ID
DESERT STORM



Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM proved that the U.S. Army has quality soldiers, sound doctrine, and the finest equipment in the world. As the Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Sullivan, has pointed out, *"Training is the glue that holds it all together."* Realistic training in peacetime develops trust, unit cohesion, teamwork, and the control mechanisms that lead to success in battle. Training for war encompasses many things—some measureable and some harder to quantify. This chapter addresses some of the more significant aspects of teamwork, cohesion, and preparing for war at battalion and company level.

TEAMWORK AND COHESION

Battalion and company commanders asserted that teamwork and cohesion within their unit, with other units, and with other services played a major role in the resounding successes of Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Teamwork and cohesion were built through tough, realistic training conducted to exacting standards. Tough, realistic training built trust and confidence among soldiers and leaders. Those comments were echoed by all battalion and company commanders. Commanders used every means available to foster teamwork and cohesion within their unit. As stated by one commander, *"Individual readiness is a state of mind. If a soldier is confident in his abilities, his weapon and his fire team, he'll execute fire and maneuver well in combat. Also, attitude is a very important factor of individual readiness, even more than aptitude."*



An open dialogue between subordinates and leaders fostered cohesion and trust. Commanders stated it was important to establish an open and honest command climate. Subordinates at all levels and positions were encouraged to participate in warfighting sessions, rehearsals, and After Action Reviews (AARs). Many company





commanders reported spending as much time as possible, in an informal environment, with soldiers and noncommissioned officers discussing training, upcoming operations, and the general direction of the unit.

Most commanders expressed the importance of establishing interpersonal relationships with subordinate leaders. Commanders believed that those relationships gave them a better understanding of their subordinates' strengths and weaknesses. Knowledge of one another proved essential to building cohesive teams. According to LTC Edward Dyer, Cdr, 1-37 Ar, 3rd Bde, 1AD, DESERT STORM, "*...knowing them at work or in the unit is not enough. You've got to know them personally; you've got to know their families, and if possible, know the interrelationships between them and their families. I had one commander who could operate independent of his family, or at least that's the impression he gave. And then I had another who was the opposite. This commander had to have the support of his family, had to know that his family was taken care of or he was much less effective. You have to know soldiers that well to understand their strengths and weaknesses.*"

A few commanders assumed command of their units only shortly before hostilities in JUST CAUSE or DESERT STORM. Those



commanders had to become part of existing teams quickly. To achieve that goal, each believed he had to talk extensively with his respective leaders and soldiers to hear their concerns and to get to know them. Each became actively involved in all levels of training—squad, platoon, company, and battalion—to provide guidance and to get to know his unit and personnel. The commanders asserted it was just as important for the unit to know them as it was for them to know the unit.

Commanders stated the importance of assimilating attachments quickly in order to train as a team. When the decision to task organize is made, commanders stressed the changes should be effected immediately. All commented that the habitual relationships established during peacetime with supporting units paid big dividends in combat.


Trust and Confidence Building Teamwork and Cohesion
Disciplined Units Working as a Team
Character of Individual Soldier

DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

Commander's Intent

Commanders overlaid their intent on how they expected to fight their units through training in peacetime. Many battalion and company commanders reported that they understood how their commander expected to fight the unit as a result of their peacetime training experiences. Subordinate commanders had a clear understanding of the standards for combat operations. Further, they believed they understood what their commanders wanted and consequently could anticipate their actions and orders.

All commanders asserted that a clear understanding of their commander's intent was an absolute requirement for planning and preparing for combat operations. Commanders worked hard to make their intent clear and concise. They wanted to develop an intent that would allow subordinates to make the right decisions in the absence of orders.





Centralized Planning

During the preparation phase, once the battalion order was received and command guidance issued, the staff immediately prepared courses of action for the commander. Commanders wargamed the courses of action with the staff, fire support coordinator, subordinate commanders, and leaders of attached units. At company level, commanders wargamed options with their leaders and incorporated comments from the executive officer, first sergeant, platoon leaders, and noncommissioned officers. Commanders reported that they wanted the leaders involved in the planning process as much as possible. Many concluded that by opening the process to suggestion and feedback, subordinate leaders felt that part of the operation plan was their own. As one commander stated, *"By my adopting their suggestions, they invested themselves in the plan and hence owned a part of it as well as the responsibility for its success."*

Briefbacks

Every commander required his subordinates to conduct briefbacks as soon as they had developed their plans. Commanders wanted to ensure their subordinates understood the intent, the operation plan, and how the unit fit into the overall operation. During the briefbacks, subordinate commanders could express concerns or suggest changes. All commanders declared the most successful briefbacks were those that allowed for a free exchange of ideas. Subordinates added that by briefing the plan to their commander and hearing his comments, they understood his intent better. As stated by CPT Roger Alford, Cdr, A Trp, 1-1 Cav, 1AD, DESERT STORM, *"Briefbacks may seem like just a formality during peacetime... a neat thing for the training centers, but you must do them to ensure complete understanding of the plan."*



Many battalion and company commanders noted that by being able to listen to briefbacks of their fellow commanders, they gained a better appreciation for the concept and the scheme of maneuver.

Briefbacks allow commanders to come to an agreement on the intent and execution of the plan.

Rehearsals

Commanders at all echelons believed that rehearsals were critical to the success of their units in combat. They could not rehearse enough. Rehearsals served two functions. First, rehearsals ensured that the plan would work as developed, and second, they reinforced the team's knowledge of its respective parts in the plan. Commanders approached rehearsals with a "crawl, walk, run" methodology. Plans were rehearsed on mapboards, then on sand tables, then in walk-throughs, in wheeled vehicles, and finally with as many vehicles and assets as time and space permitted. Whenever possible, rehearsals included combat support and combat service support to simulate combat conditions.

Commanders involved as many people as possible during rehearsals. They believed it was important to include assistant staff officers, junior NCOs, and enlisted soldiers. Many commented that these people often brought up issues and suggested alternate courses of action that had been overlooked by the commanders and staff.

Battalion commanders reported that attending division rehearsals gave them a better appreciation of the division commander's intent and how their units fit into the scheme of maneuver. Company commanders echoed the same for brigade rehearsals.



The After Action Review (AAR) was an important part of the rehearsal process. AARs focused on what happened, why it happened, and what changes were needed. Following the AARs, the rehearsal process was repeated. A few commanders commented on the utility of continuing the process into combat as time permitted.

Commanders planned and rehearsed sustainment and medical evacuation of the operation as much as the maneuver. The long movement distances anticipated during DESERT STORM magnified the normal challenges of sustaining a unit on the move. Commanders planned how their unit would recover disabled vehicles with limited recovery assets while continuing the pace of advance, navigating refuelers to the refueling point and then back to their unit which had continued to advance, and a myriad of other details. Medical evacuation also posed some tough problems. For example, how do the two medics who are working in the back of the M113 treating wounded drive the track to the casualty collection point? Mass casualty

treatment and evacuation, and treating casualties on a contaminated battlefield were also addressed. These are just a few examples of logistics issues that commanders and staffs had to solve to maximize combat power against the enemy.

Contingencies

As part of rehearsals, commanders took the time to plan and practice the "what-ifs" or branches of the operation. Units rehearsed their actions against differing threat scenarios responding to light infantry, armor, urban combat, and bunker complexes. It was common for a commander to halt a rehearsal to consider "What is the worst thing that could happen at this point?" and then develop and integrate a course of action to meet that threat.



Units planned and rehearsed how they would fight with the loss of key personnel, the succession of command, the loss of vehicles, decontamination procedures, and the evacuation of prisoners of war. Contingencies were rehearsed at night and during periods of limited visibility. As one commander stated, *"The plan gets me to the line of scrimmage. From there I call audibles. Contingency planning gives me that flexibility."*

At the battalion and company level, contingencies were executed as drills.

Drills and SOPs

All commanders claimed emphatically that drills were key to their success. The routine of practicing the drill repeatedly to standard, gave soldiers and commanders a common reference to the performances required to accomplish a given mission without delay. By providing that common reference, as one commander stated, *"Drills were a key tool which enabled soldiers and units to overcome or alleviate the confusion of battle."*

Most commanders indicated that they executed battle drills as dictated by the appropriate mission training plan or field manual. Commanders limited the number of drills they trained for and concentrated on those drills which they expected to perform in combat. In many cases, commanders met with subordinates and together decided which drills were important based on their mission essential task list and the operations they expected to perform. Commanders stressed that it was important to keep battle drills simple.

As soldiers trained and practiced drills, their increasing proficiency produced confidence in themselves, each other, and in the unit's ability to fight. That shared confidence strengthened unit cohesion and contributed to the building of the team. After both operations, many soldiers commented, *"Hey, those drills really worked. We did exactly what we had been trained to do and didn't do anything different."*

Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) were crucial to the success of the units. SOPs made actions routine and eliminated confusion about responsibilities and the process of how those actions were to be completed. SOPs covered everything from the orders process, communications plans, flank coordination, and load plans, to how units would conduct pre-combat inspections. Commanders stated that SOPs saved valuable time in the preparation for and conduct of the fight. SOPs made routine things happen routinely.

Commanders' Observations

Units have to know how to rehearse. There is a tendency for task forces to only concentrate on maneuver. It's extremely important to practice the integration of fire support, distribution of fires, combat support, and combat service support. You must ask questions and make subordinates give you feedback during rehearsals.

LTC Henry L. Kinnison
Cdr, 1-187 In, 3rd Bde, 101ABN
DESERT STORM

Because of the unclear nature of our mission of movement to contact, our contingency planning with the combat operation was reduced to drills. We did some contingency planning with casualties, EPWs, and the effects of chemicals, but in terms of prosecuting combat against the enemy, it's a function of well-rehearsed, simple drills.

LTC Michael McGee
Cdr, 6-6 In, 3rd Bde, 1AD
DESERT STORM

I came away from JUST CAUSE with a belief in the value of rehearsals that is absolutely unshakeable. You cannot rehearse too much. That's all there is to it. It improves your proficiency in executing the operation and it is a great confidence builder.

LTC James Reed
Cdr, 4-6 In, 2nd Bde, 5ID
JUST CAUSE

I would issue a plan to the company commanders and allow them some flexibility to execute it as quickly and effectively as possible. That didn't mean I would agree with everything that they backbriefed, but there was good interaction. When the discussion broke off, we were in synchronization with one another to accomplish the assigned mission.

LTC Harry Axson
Cdr, 2-504 In, 1st Bde, 82ABN
JUST CAUSE

Commanders' Observations (continued)

We would do centralized planning at battalion and go through a very extensive warfighting session with commanders. Company commanders had tremendous input during the development of the plan. My company commanders had the authority to change their plans as they saw fit, and then go through a series of briefbacks to ensure everyone knew how the changes affected the plan.

LTC Johnny Brooks
Cdr, 4-17 In, 3rd Bde, 7ID(L)
JUST CAUSE

I had the company medical vehicle with me, and I told my troops that I would make sure they would get medical attention. A soldier must be confident that he and his buddy will be taken care of if they are hurt. You have to let them know you're going to get them out.

CPT Chris Rizzo
Cdr, C Co, 4-17 In, 3rd Bde, 7ID(L)
JUST CAUSE

We had an excellent team, and the cohesion was a big factor in combat. In light infantry, the real cohesion lies at platoon level and lower. Everybody's got allegiance to the company, but in the team and squad it is just like your family would be.

CPT Joe Anderson
Cdr, B Co, 2-75 Rgr Regt
JUST CAUSE

Our trust in one another was one of the biggest factors for the high morale in our unit.

CPT David L. Francavilla
Cdr, C Co, 1-5 Cav, 2nd Bde, 1CAV
DESERT STORM

Every time we conducted a rehearsal or wargamed a contingency I assembled the troops as much as possible. I wanted all of my soldiers involved so they could hear it from me and understand the big picture.

CPT Mike Bills
Cdr, B Trp, 1-4 Cav, 1ID
DESERT STORM

Chapter 2

Conducting the Fight

Commanders must have the ability to command by intuition, a sensing for what's right. It is that feel for the battle that enables commanders to make timely decisions. This intuitive feel is developed through experience and training. If you can command by intuition, you can do it quicker. Future commanders must be able to ask the right questions. If not, they will be overwhelmed with reams of information.

LTC Charles Thomas Rogers
Cdr, 1st Bn, Staffordshire Regt, 1AD(UK)
DESERT STORM



Discussions on the importance of drills and SOPs in combat bring into focus another aspect of battle command in combat: control. Drills and SOPs enabled commanders to command effectively because they ensured similar responses to similar conditions. Just as subordinates needed to know their commander's intent, commanders needed to know how their subordinates would react. Other elements of control which enabled commanders to command included the orders process, commanders' locations, command presence, and the use of key personnel within the unit.

ORDERS PROCESS

For clarity, this chapter describes the orders process in chronological order. The process begins with the receipt of orders, continues to the planning process, and culminates in the methods commanders used to issue their orders. The orders process described in this chapter should not be confused with the deliberate process which took place prior to hostilities in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

Receiving Orders During Combat

Typically, battalions received orders from brigade via FM radio. Brigade commanders and staff passed orders to battalion, and executive or operations officers usually acknowledged receipt. Commanders eavesdropped on brigade nets and monitored incoming





orders while their staff received the information. The commander immediately passed a warning order to subordinate companies. Most commanders consciously avoided exerting their presence over the radio. That freed them to concentrate on the fight.

The process was similar at company level. As company executive officers received an order, the company commander, aware of the order through eavesdropping, immediately alerted his platoon leaders. In this manner, the entire command was aware that a new order was forthcoming. As a result, everyone in the unit was poised to respond to the new order even before it was issued.

Clearly, there is tension between the position taken by the battalion commander LTC Tystad, and the company commander CPT McMaster on the communication to subordinate units of changes to mission orders. This is to be expected in that ultimately the commander is the best judge of his unit's capability to absorb those changes. METT-T dependent, these were two techniques that proved successful to these units at a given time in battle.

The Planning Process In Combat

Most battalion commanders issued commander's guidance and left their staff to plan the details. Some commanders did the planning themselves. The deciding factors were available time and the immediate situation. All orders were issued in the FRAGO format.

At battalion, some commanders delegated a large part of the planning to their staff. In essence, they concentrated on fighting the current battle and let their staff plan for the next. Those commanders eavesdropped on the incoming order and gave commander's guidance to their staff. Once planning was complete and the commander agreed

with the course of action, the Jump TOC or operations officer issued the order with the commander eavesdropping to clarify gray areas and answer questions.

If little time was available, many commanders quickly sketched out a plan of action and issued the order. The staff, eavesdropping on the order, resolved any problems. Given more time, all commanders preferred to involve their subordinate leaders and staff. During the planning of the FRAGO, many commanders used a blank format to ensure they covered all essential pieces of information. During JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, due to the intensive rehearsals and extensive planning, it was often enough to give the time, objective, and mission.

At company level, all commanders planned the operation from their location. Many reported the changes did not require much planning and consisted mainly of a change of direction or the execution of a drill. As stated earlier for JUST CAUSE, most changes to the order had already been planned as a contingency and had been rehearsed by the unit. Any modifications to the contingency were quickly worked out by the company commander.

Eavesdropping and crosstalk played a crucial role in the rapid orders process during combat. Eavesdropping was critical in keeping the fighting commander attuned to each development. Crosstalk was essential because it allowed subordinate commanders to work out details that were not mentioned. All commanders encouraged crosstalk by subordinate leaders on the command net. Commanders



mentioned that subordinates' crosstalk aided their ability to see the battlefield across their front. Many stated crosstalk was not something that happened automatically within units, but was a technique that had to be continually stressed by commanders and practiced during peacetime.

Issuing Orders During Combat

Every commander stated there was no substitute for giving orders face-to-face. It was important to look in the subordinate's eyes, gauge his understanding, and hear his concerns. Many leaders stated that only by giving orders face-to-face could they be certain of a mutual understanding of the order.



Commanders reported using briefbacks, and on rare occasions rehearsals, during combat as a method of ensuring their orders were clearly understood. These were especially critical during the latter phases of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM as commanders were starting to feel the effects of fatigue, brought on by the stress of combat and sleep deprivation.







Many stated that fatigue made it difficult to stay focused and to clearly articulate their orders and intent. Subordinate leaders, feeling the same effects of fatigue, reported it was hard at times to comprehend orders given over the radio or even face-to-face. Briefbacks and rehearsals were methods to ensure understanding of the order. It must be understood that those methods were not always possible due to the tempo of the operations. It was mentioned that simple orders, practiced SOPs, and rehearsed drills helped alleviate the confusion brought on by fatigue and combat.



Because of their close proximity to their subordinates, company commanders had more opportunities to hold quick orders groups. Battalion commanders were not always physically able to assemble orders groups, and had to give orders via FM radio. In many instances, commanders went to the company commander's location and issued the order face-to-face. As the tempo of the battle increased, commanders at all levels increasingly relied on FM. Company executive officers facilitated the process by crosstalking among themselves, working out details of flank coordination, unit positions, and ensuring everyone had the same understanding of the order.

A point must be made on how most commanders operated their command nets. Battalion and company commanders allowed their executive officers or operations officers to receive orders from higher and send orders to subordinate commanders. During DESERT STORM, mounted commanders consistently reported maintaining their main radio on their command net and monitoring higher's net on the auxillary receiver. During JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, commanders were comfortable talking with the executive officer, operations officer, or platoon sergeant. They wanted their commanders and platoon leaders commanding their units rather than worrying about responding to calls from higher.

COMMANDER'S POSITION ON THE BATTLEFIELD

All commanders positioned themselves where they could see the fight and control fires. Determining the commander's position on the battlefield is not an exact science. Commanders must have an intuitive feel for where they are needed to best control and command the fight. As one commander stated, *"There were times that I needed to be up with the lead platoon, there were other times that I needed to be behind the lead company, and then there were times I needed to go to the flanks."* Many commanders commented that while a commander has to be in position to see the battlefield, he should not become one of the fighters and lose sight of the battlefield or his ability to command. On occasion, commanders found they needed to fire their weapon system





in order to influence the fight, give direction, or in self defense. Some commanders let their gunners scan for targets and engage once fires were cleared by the commander. The point was made by all that the commander should not spend his energy acquiring targets or becoming involved in one-on-one engagements. LTC David Gross, Cdr, 3-37 Ar, 2nd Bde, 1ID, DESERT STORM, stated; *"The commander should only enter the direct fire fight when he has to influence the fight by his personal engagement in combat. Until that occurs, his primary task is to concentrate his force at the decisive time and place, so they can engage and kill the enemy."*

During DESERT STORM, company commanders were either behind or with the lead platoon. Several commanders mentioned they were with the lead platoon not only for command purposes, but also because they had the only navigational device. Most

commanders commented that during engagements and once a base of fire was set, they moved with the assaulting elements. During JUST CAUSE, company commanders also positioned themselves forward to see the battlefield. However, due to the restricted terrain, commanders positioned themselves with the main effort and relied on other leaders to assist them with seeing and reading the battlefield.

Commanders reported that they selected their position during planning and rehearsals. During rehearsals, they identified potential critical points and their position in formations where they could best synchronize fires and affect the outcome of a battle. Commanders stated that wherever they were, they had to be able to instantly identify a critical point and then move there. Their positions were rehearsed during both good and limited visibility conditions.

KEY PERSONNEL

Commanders relied heavily on people within their command to help them see and read the battlefield. All asserted that to a large extent they followed the doctrinal norms as to how they used and positioned key personnel. Depending on the situation, many altered responsibilities based on the personalities and the strengths and weaknesses of subordinates.

Battalion

As stated earlier, commanders positioned themselves forward on the battlefield to see the enemy, gauge his resistance, and synchronize combat power. Most commanders reported the executive officer was



the one person who allowed them to command forward. In most cases, the executive officer was involved in everything the unit was doing. In addition, battalion commanders mentioned the operations officer, the command sergeant major, and the headquarters company commander as keys to the unit's operations.

At battalion, the executive officer operated in the command post and was responsible for its operation. All battalion commanders remarked their executive officers tied all the actions of the battalion together. The executive officer typically maintained communications with brigade, ensured orders were received and passed correctly, and tracked the battle and status of adjacent units. When the unit was not engaged, he became involved in the sustainment effort. The executive officer often kept the commander and operations officer from making mistakes by eavesdropping on their orders.

Battalion commanders used their operations officers forward as another set of experienced and educated eyes, usually on another axis or flank. Operations officers assisted the commanders with control of the unit, the synchronization of fires, and the employment of combat support assets. In most instances, they were responsible for maintaining communications with brigade and either the operations officer or the executive officer would talk to the brigade commander.



Most battalion commanders emphasized the importance of the headquarters company commander in combat operations. The headquarters company commander's main responsibility was to ensure effective logistics flow from the battalion rear to the forward platoons. He ensured the timely requisition of rations, fuel, and ammunition and pushed them forward to the combat trains. While he

was usually in the field trains, he moved around the battlefield as necessary. Because of this complex mission, many battalion commanders selected officers with previous command experience as their headquarters company commander.

Both battalion and company commanders relied heavily on their command sergeants major and first sergeants. Many affirmed the command sergeant major and the first sergeant should be role models for the enlisted soldier. They need to be out and about sharing the same burdens of the soldiers and officers, regardless of weather, time of day, or conditions. That has great impact on the morale of the soldier.

In some cases the command sergeant major or first sergeant was the only leader in the unit with previous combat experience and was thus able to give the commander valuable advice. More importantly, he helped prepare soldiers for their first combat experience. The senior noncommissioned officer was all over the battlefield. A few were positioned forward with the commander, but most operated out of the combat trains area and moved forward to overwatch the sustainment



effort and casualty evacuation. The senior noncommissioned officer spent as much time as possible talking to soldiers. Commanders relied on their perspective of the morale and status of the troops.

During JUST CAUSE, battalion command sergeants major were often forward on the battlefield acting as another set of eyes and another means of passing orders. Many assisted with the control of combat forces and were positioned at critical places on the battlefield. As one commander related, *"My command sergeant major was one of the few NCOs in the unit with a fair amount of combat experience, so I decided to put him at the casualty collection point which was well forward. In retrospect, that was the right thing to do, because there were a number of casualties coming back throughout the night. At one point, they received a number of casualties from one of our companies, the possibility of having confusion at the casualty collection point really concerned me. Having the calm, steady presence of the command sergeant major there made the medical evacuation process work. At one point the casualty collection point was itself taken under fire, and having him there to get that under control and return fire worked beautifully."*

During DESERT STORM, command sergeants major were very mobile, moving between the field trains, combat trains and company trains. Many battalion commanders commented that their command sergeants major seemed to be everywhere, talking with soldiers, smoothing problems in the logistics and maintenance efforts, and assisting the commander with control of the unit.

In addition to the above individuals, battalion commanders had certain individuals they wanted in close proximity to aid them in controlling the battle. During JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, commanders insisted the fire support officer, or fire support coordinator, and air liaison officer travel with the command group. That was particularly important to light forces which depended on indirect fire and close air support to supplement their firepower.

During DESERT STORM, most commanders selected a talented senior noncommisioned officer as part of their crew. That person assisted the commander with answering the radio, posting maps, and navigating the vehicle. Commanders reported that the assistance gave them time to think and fight their units.

Company

Company commanders relied on their executive officers to track the battle, receive spot reports from platoons, and maintain communication with battalion. The executive officer usually travelled forward within the company and assisted the commander with the control of forces. They were second in command and in position to take charge of the unit if required.

Commanders commented that the first sergeant was key to their success. Company commanders stated they often sought his advice on the tough issues and leaned heavily on his experience.

During JUST CAUSE, company commanders often positioned their first sergeants up front or at a critical point on the battlefield where the commander couldn't be. First sergeants on occasion controlled combat forces. Many were involved in the casualty evacuation process. During DESERT STORM, first sergeants tended to focus on logistics, maintenance, and casualty and prisoner evacuation.

COMMAND PRESENCE

You must look your soldiers in the eye to see if the fires are still burning in their hearts.

All commanders commented that their presence and visibility forward on the battlefield were important. Many asserted that their presence, as well as that of the senior noncommissioned officer, increased the confidence and morale of the soldiers. Many believed it important for soldiers to know that their commander led from the front and therefore shared their hardships and the rigors and danger of combat. Commanders took every opportunity to walk the line during refueling and other pauses to talk to the soldiers, get their perspective, and look them in the eye to get an assessment of their morale. The commander's forward presence is necessary not only to allow the commander to view the battlefield, but also to allow the men to see the commander.





Commanders' Observations

If subordinate commanders don't crosstalk on the higher command's net, the unit will fail or the mission will be more difficult. The command net is for commanders and commanders must talk to one another. When two subordinate commanders had an issue to solve within the confines of my intent, I made them work it out over the net.

LTC Henry L. Kinnison
Cdr, 1-187 In, 3rd Bde, 101ABN
DESERT STORM

I never personally talked with company XOs at all that night. I dealt with company commanders. In theory, talking to XOs is nice, but quite frankly XOs often times are in no better position than the battalion commander to know what's going on, because they aren't up front. In effect, the reports you are getting about what's happening are coming from the back of the company column rather than the front, and you may be misled.

LTC James Reed
Cdr, 4-6 In, 2nd Bde, 5ID
JUST CAUSE

I would make it a point during refueling to walk the line, show the flag, and look the guys in the eyes. You have to take every chance to look into their eyes, see how tired they are, whether they're scared, and get a feel for how they are doing. This is a lesson I will carry over into the next combat situation.

CPT Robert Burns
Cdr, C Co, 2-34 Ar, 1st Bde, 1ID
DESERT STORM

The first sergeant was the guy that would bring up fuel, chow, and ammo. He controlled the medical evacuation of wounded Iraqi prisoners. He was always up on the net, and I would talk to him. The great thing about the first sergeant was that he was a Bradley platoon sergeant before he took the company. He would come up on the net and say, "You're not spread out enough, and you're not scanning. One Bradley hasn't looked to his rear for three minutes."

CPT Wayne Grigsby
Cdr, B Co, 3-7 In, 1st Bde, 24ID
DESERT STORM

Commanders' Observations (continued)

We didn't have to go over much detail because we knew our battle drills and SOPs. I would basically tell them what our mission was and when I thought we would launch.

CPT Robert King
Cdr, D Co, 4-67 Ar, 3rd B DE, 3AD
DESERT STORM

The key to understanding the rapid orders process in combat is to routinely use the deliberate orders process over and over in training until everyone understands it and they are forced into the same mode of thinking. The worst situation you can get into is when people are not confident in their ability to execute the orders process. Every leader has to be able to identify rapidly the key and essential information.

I was immediately behind the assault platoon, which had the breach element in it. The reason for this was that the breach was the first key event that had to occur for us to get onto the objective area. It also enabled me to see not only the objective, but also the flanks.

CPT Dan Allyn
Cdr, C Co 1-75 Rgr Regt
JUST CAUSE

I strongly encouraged my lieutenants to listen and learn from their NCOs because of their increased experience. The officers learned much from the DESERT SHIELD/STORM experience alone, but they learned more from their NCOs.

I made it a point that at every opportunity I went around in my Bradley to talk to soldiers to see how they were doing, what were their concerns, and judge their morale. It's important that commanders have a face-to-face with soldiers as much as possible.

CPT Mike Bills
Cdr, B Trp, 1-4 Cav, 1ID
DESERT STORM

Chapter 3

Proven Successful Leadership Techniques

Execution must be decentralized whether it is a parade, a training jump, or an actual combat mission. I centralize planning and decentralize execution for all tasks or missions. When company commanders backbrief me on their scheme of maneuver, I'm there to provide logistical support, synchronize the operation, and ensure that we are focused on accomplishing the same end result.



LTC Harry Axson
Cdr, 2-504 IN, 1st Bde, 82ABN
JUST CAUSE

In both JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, many commanders shared several leadership techniques that proved instrumental to their success in combat. This chapter examines a few of those techniques.

CENTRALIZED PLANNING, DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

Though commanders believed that centralized planning ensured a concerted effort, all commanders emphasized decentralized execution. Before combat, commanders communicated their intent and trained their subordinates to standard. Rehearsals ensured intent was understood and standards were met. Once battle began, commanders made a conscious effort to avoid breaking their subordinates' concentration on the fight. Battalion commanders let company commanders fight their fight as long as they were within the parameters of the commander's intent and the scheme of maneuver of the operation.

Many commanders drove home the point that decentralized execution must be trained in peacetime if it is to be effective in war. Junior leaders must be confident in their decision-making ability, and confident in their superiors' support of their decisions.



Eavesdropping again played a key role. Commanders monitored their subordinates' progress and intervened only when necessary. During execution all commanders encouraged their subordinates to make decisions, and then marshalled assets, when required, to support those decisions.

PRE-COMBAT INSPECTIONS, LOAD PLANS

Commanders commented on the importance of conducting routine, uncompromising pre-combat inspections. Pre-combat inspections accomplished two things. First, they established standards for readiness



of equipment and personnel and gave the chain of command a method of ensuring standards were being met. Second, routine inspections by leaders helped maintain the serviceability of equipment. That was especially true in Southwest Asia where the harsh environment and lack of repair parts made acceptable operational readiness rates difficult to maintain. While pre-combat inspections may be squad leader responsibilities, they must be checked at every echelon to ensure leaders are enforcing the standards.

The amount of equipment our soldiers carried to meet all contingencies made strict adherence to load plans a necessity. Commanders emphasized that load plans should be standardized throughout the battalion for like vehicles. As CPT Bart Howard, Cdr, A Co, 3-67 Ar, Tiger Brigade, DESERT STORM, stated, *"There is no such thing as initiative in load plans. It is strictly compliance."*

FIRE DISTRIBUTION

To maximize combat power, commanders concentrated on their unit's ability to mass and synchronize fires at any given time and from any formation. Fire distribution proved essential to massing fires on the battlefield. All units trained fire distribution to the standards of existing manuals. Commanders incorporated fire distribution, direct and indirect, in all rehearsals, drills and maneuver training.



During DESERT STORM, all mechanized units used frontal fire and kept it very simple. Units used vehicle fenders as left and right direct fire limits. Commanders pointed out that every vehicle within a formation had a sector of fire. The air defense weapon control measures of *hold, tight,* and *free* were often adopted to ensure fires inside formations were controlled. Vehicles in the lead might have been under *weapons free,* whereas vehicles inside the formation might have been under *weapons tight.*

During JUST CAUSE, fire distribution was carefully planned to preclude civilian casualties and collateral damage. Several techniques were employed by commanders to control and distribute fires. Heavy machine guns were often limited to firing above street level because of their lethality and range, platoons were limited to firing on designated streets in certain directions, and troops were to use only the required force necessary to meet the threat.

Commanders in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM emphasized their belief that company commanders cannot be burdened with having to control indirect fires and tactical air while controlling the direct fires of their unit. The battalion commander controlled those fires if they were not controlled by brigade. Company commanders must be free to concentrate on the control of their direct fires. Direct fires were

planned at battalion, but were executed at company level and below. Commanders synchronized the fires within their units to maximize their capabilities and put fires on the enemy throughout the depth of his formation. Tanks, Bradleys, and anti-armor weapons were given specific targets at specific ranges.

PREVENTION OF FRATRICIDE

Fratricide was a major concern for all leaders involved in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Commanders broke down the prevention of fratricide into three key areas: identification, fire discipline, and situational awareness.

Identification

All units trained vehicle identification using standard graphic training aids. During DESERT SHIELD, many units arranged visits to Allied units to familiarize their soldiers with Allied vehicles. Some units' master gunners devised innovative means to help their soldiers identify vehicles using their thermal sights. For example, some master gunners painted the exhaust ports of threat vehicle models with chemlight fluid. That doctored model replicated what the actual vehicles looked like when viewed through thermal sights.

All units used a marking system beyond unit designations and national symbols. DESERT STORM units used an inverted V. Many

commanders adopted patterns of different colored blackout lights on the rear of their vehicles. Commanders marked vehicles with orange VS-17 panels to aid in recognition of friendly aircraft.

Some JUST CAUSE commanders reported that helmet covers intended as camouflage in fact helped to distinguish friend from foe. JUST CAUSE soldiers were also marked with strips of luminous tape (GLINT). Some JUST CAUSE units used slap-on magnetic symbols which identified both friendly vehicles integral to units and any vehicles captured and used during the operation.

Commanders stated that while marking systems and technology may help reduce the incidents of fratricide, disciplined soldiers and situational awareness on the battlefield were the principal means of avoiding casualties to friendly fire. Commanders affirmed repeatedly that leaders must have absolute control over fires, and positive identification must be made before friendly forces engage.

Fire Discipline

Many DESERT STORM heavy force commanders stated they sacrificed time and standoff distance during engagements to prevent fratricide. Although TOW missiles and tank main guns were effective at over 3000 meters, many commanders refused to engage at that distance. Commanders sacrificed time and closed within 2000 meters to ensure positive identification. All fires had to be cleared through the company commander unless soldiers had to fire in self defense. Many battalion commanders reserved the right to clear fires. Upon receiving a spot report, company commanders would call battalion to

report contact and verify absence of friendlies. Until positive enemy identification could be made, units continued to close the distance, or use other means, to ensure enemy identification before engaging.

One commander emphasized the importance of having the aviation battle captain control air strikes because the aviation captain knew the location of the ground units. He stated he wouldn't let tactical air come in unless it was brought in by the aviation battle captain in his helicopter. Also important was the selection of appropriate ordnance. One commander commented he would not allow the use of cluster bombs on his objective since dud bomblets would create a minefield his unit would have to negotiate.

Both light and heavy force commanders stressed the importance of live fire training in preventing fratricide. According to one commander, *"You have to have positive control over your fires, otherwise you increase the possibility of fratricide. I am a very big believer in live fire exercises because I think soldiers must be confident that their*



buddies on their left and right aren't going to shoot them. If you don't train to that point in a live fire environment, out to the outer edge of the envelope during peacetime, you are asking for accidents to occur in wartime. Live fire exercises build tremendous confidence in leaders and soldiers alike."

Situational Awareness

Situational awareness begins with each soldier's knowledge of his place in the unit's formation and the location of the rest of his unit. A company commander must know his company's position relative to the battalion scheme of maneuver. A battalion commander must know the location of his units as well as the status and position of adjacent forces.

Many commanders positioned a liaison with their flanking units. The unit on the boundary often eavesdropped on the flanking unit's net. Battalion command posts eavesdropped on flank units as well. That ensured the units knew their respective locations. Similarly, strict enforcement of link-up at contact points attributed to knowing the locations of friendly units on the battlefield.

Coordination and exchange of information at contact points consisted of more than making eye-to-eye contact and then moving to the next contact point. Commanders wanted to know exact location, direction of movement, type of formation, and location of suspected enemy contact of flanking units. That information then had to be passed within the unit in order to do the unit any good.

COMMANDER'S CONDUCT

Many commanders stressed the importance of remaining cool during the heat of battle. By remaining calm, commanders projected their control of themselves and the situation. Commanders were very cautious on how they talked on the radio during combat. Orders given

in a calm, clear voice were more readily understood. The commander's calm presence on the radio decreased the confusion of battle. The fight itself put stress on the combatants. Respondents concluded that excited commanders who lost their composure on the radio would simply add to the stress and confusion and increase the chance that their subordinates would make mistakes.

Commanders who were calm and collected exuded confidence in their unit's ability to accomplish the mission. As stated by LTC Edward Dyer, Cdr, 1-37 Ar, 3rd Bde, 1AD, DESERT STORM, "*My concern throughout the operation was making sure these guys sensed me as being very confident and collected, because panic could get out of hand in a hurry. I was very conscious of how I talked on the radio, especially when we got into that night fight and*



there were explosions and tracers flying everywhere. That night, one of my commanders had his tank shot out from under him and was wounded. I had to force myself to disassociate from that whole thing and concentrate on keeping the battalion moving." Commanders commented that the confident and collected manner of the commander during combat helped keep the unit focused on the mission and returning fire on the enemy.

Commanders' Observations

More than anything else I had confidence in my soldiers, junior leaders and staff. They were trained and I knew they would carry the fight to the enemy. I trusted them and they knew I trusted them. I think in JUST CAUSE, which was a company commander's war, being a decentralized commander paid big dividends, because I wasn't in the knickers of my company commanders all the time. I gave them the mission and let them do it. I couldn't do it for them. They did their jobs.

LTC Johnny Brooks
Cdr, 4-17 In, 3rd Bde, 7ID(L)
JUST CAUSE

During the initial fire fight, we almost fired on one of our adjacent battalion's companies. Their right flank company went out in front of my Charlie Company in pursuit of some fleeing Iraqis. The Charlie Company commander took an extra twenty seconds, switched from thermal to daylight sights, saw square turrets and identified them as friendly.

LTC Timothy Reischl
Cdr, 4-67 Ar, 3rd Bde, 3AD
DESERT STORM

You can always pull a guy aside after a mission and rip his heart out if that will make you feel better. But what you can never do is take back harsh words, sharply said on the radio in combat. You can't take that back and it can do incredible damage.

LTC Gregory Fontenot
Cdr, 2-34 Ar, 1st Bde, 1ID
DESERT STORM

The most important things are to have the soldiers confident in their abilities and mentally ready to go on a moment's notice. They are never going to have every piece of equipment in optimum condition. But I've got to get them focused on what I want them to accomplish; I've got to get them mentally ready. If a soldier believes in himself, he will accomplish whatever he is asked to do.

LTC Harry Axson
Cdr, 2-504 In, 1st Bde, 82ABN
JUST CAUSE

Commanders' Observations (continued)

We did everything we possibly could to impose fire control measures and reinforce the rules of engagement. The biggest concern was to make sure soldiers were personally aware of the possibility of fratricide in this environment. I was really impressed with the level of individual discipline that soldiers were showing in some pretty tough circumstances. Our soldiers were not only concerned about fratricide, but also about not hurting civilians.

LTC James Reed
Cdr, 4-6 In, 2nd Bde, 5ID
JUST CAUSE

The brigade and battalion commander were always clear. They operated with mission-type orders: task and purpose. My battalion commander allowed me to run the show. I felt that I could do whatever I needed to do to get the mission done and confident that both of those commanders would back me on any of my decisions.

CPT Chris Rizzo
Cdr, C Co 4-17 In, 3rd Bde, 7ID
JUST CAUSE

Routine live fire exercises instill discipline and confidence in our soldiers, their leaders, and their unit. Live fire exercises prepare soldiers for the uncertainty of combat. The most uncertain part of an airborne operation is before you are assembled. You have hundreds of soldiers moving to their assembly areas, and you are initially in an almost 360 degree field of fire and defense. When you receive indiscriminate enemy fire, a disciplined soldier realizes that somebody is going to deal with that target; it doesn't have to be him from 400 meters.

CPT Dan Allyn
Cdr, C Co 1-75 Rgr Regt
JUST CAUSE

Chapter 4

Maintaining the Edge

There is no more awesome sense of responsibility than to be charged with the lives of hundreds of the sons and daughters of the nation. It's overwhelming and only combat can bring you to your knees on this.

Johnny W. Brooks
In, 3rd Bde, 7ID(L)
JUST CAUSE

Commanders cited several contributing factors in developing and maintaining a constant state of readiness for combat, a "band of excellence" in both individuals and units. Several commanders commented on the importance of avoiding the peaks and valleys of readiness. Realistic training, sound doctrine, and disciplined soldiers allowed commanders to develop and maintain the edge needed to fight and win on the battlefield.

CHARACTER AND DISCIPLINE

Character and discipline were the touchstones that guided leaders and soldiers through the rigors of combat. In the heat of battle, soldiers must make difficult decisions with only their character and discipline to guide them. Developing those traits is vital to maintaining the edge. In the 1980s, the Army sought to develop strategies for instilling an ethos in its leaders. The strategy embodied in FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, made commanders responsible not only for tactical training of their officers and NCOs but also charged them with mentoring their subordinates. The Army challenged its leaders to develop their successors.

Many commanders attributed their success in combat in large part to the mentors that had taken them aside, trained them, and instilled a strong sense of military values—values such as respect, dedication, responsibility, and selflessness. For example, junior leaders often tended to focus on mission accomplishment rather than the means by which missions are accomplished: soldiers. Mentors redirected that focus and emphasized the importance of individual soldiers to a successful unit. In short, mentors sought to help their subordinates develop character. One commander remarked, "*When I was a young major I was mission oriented and I didn't worry about people. My battalion commander taught me how to interact with people, and through that I saw the value of making people feel good about themselves and contributing to the unit.*"

Leaders must be dedicated to their soldiers and their units. A leader's loyalty to his soldiers must be total and must exist in training for war and in combat. It is that loyalty, manifested in training, that ensures their soldiers will return home safely.

A few commanders commented on the responsibilities of command. There is no greater responsibility than being accountable for the lives of soldiers. Responsibility is exhibited by caring for soldiers and developing a thoughtful training program that builds tough, excellent soldiers and molds them into fighting units.

Commanders care for soldiers by ensuring they are led and trained by competent, professional leaders. Our soldiers deserve the best leadership we can give them. If a leader is substandard, the troops will know it first and he shouldn't be in position to lead them in war. Many commanders discussed relieving leaders who couldn't develop that bond of trust between themselves and their soldiers that is so essential in a unit. They are easily seen. During tough, demanding, realistic training, poor leaders are easily identified because they fail to develop effective fighting teams. Once identified, commanders stated that they have the responsibility to train and develop this leader and then decide if that leader's shortcomings were such that they could be compensated for by more direct attention by the senior leader. There are some shortcomings that can be accepted; there are some that cannot. Commanders related that they had to consider two other important issues before replacing a leader. First was relief of the leader the best course of action for the unit at that point and time? Second, was there a qualified replacement available who could do better?

Soldiers must have confidence in leaders or they won't take the risks necessary to win.

Soldiers expect a disciplined environment. Every soldier wants to belong to a good unit. Being part of a disciplined, well-trained unit instills pride in soldiers, both in themselves and in their unit. Discipline is the key ingredient in overcoming the rigors of combat—it frees leaders to command their units, rather than having to oversee and control each subordinate's activities.

Successful units used a disciplined approach to all activities. From simple things like daily stand-to, to standardized load plans and pre-combat checks, to well-rehearsed and executed drills, discipline permeated successful units. Over time, adherence to standards occurred whether or not leaders were physically present. That is the essence of discipline—***doing what's right, not what's easy, even when no one is looking.***

Several commanders mentioned that they used T.R. Fehrenbach's book *This Kind of War* (1963) to emphasize the importance of discipline to success in combat. Perhaps Fehrenbach himself stated that importance best, *"On line, most normal men are afraid, have been*

afraid, or will be afraid. Only when disciplined to obey orders quickly and willingly, can such fear be controlled. Only when superbly trained and conditioned against the shattering experience of war, only knowing almost from rote what to do, can men carry out their tasks come what may. And knowing they are disciplined, trained, and conditioned brings pride to men—pride in their own toughness, their own ability; and this pride will hold them true when all else fails."

The experiences reported here strongly support Fehrenbach's findings thirty years ago on the Korean War. The challenge will be to sustain the demonstrated excellence in training and leader development.

TRAINING

According to the 1986 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*, training is the cornerstone of success. Soldiers and units will perform as well in combat as in the training they have received in peace. Training, both individual and collective, is central to developing and maintaining readiness for combat. Developing Army leaders who realize the importance of training and understand how to train must be the focal point of the Army's training strategy.

All training should build confidence in soldiers and leaders alike. As stated earlier, confidence is the key ingredient that will drive soldiers and units to make the extra effort that may make the difference between defeat and victory. The structure of training should be such that it is demanding and realistic. The more demanding the training, the more confidence it builds in soldiers, squads, platoons, and companies.

Many commanders observed that the branch basic and advanced courses prepared leaders for combat. Leaders shared a common grasp of the fundamentals of the Army's warfighting doctrine because of the training they received at branch schools, and could communicate and function more effectively as a result. Several battalion commanders identified the Tactical Commander's Development Course as valuable because it trained battalion commanders to apply the Army's warfighting doctrine to solving tactical problems.

Many commanders commented on the importance of training based on a Mission Essential Task List (METL). Commanders used the METL development process described in FM 25-100, *Training the Force*. They worked with their subordinates, analyzed their mission, identified the tasks that were critical to mission accomplishment, and then trained those tasks to standard. CPT Joe Anderson, Cdr, B Co, 2-75th Rgr Regt, JUST CAUSE, related, *"You only have time for your METL. You don't have time to do all the other things you may want to do."*

Live fire training contributed to maintaining unit readiness, especially in light units since close-in small arms combat placed heavy



demands on individual soldier interaction. Frequent live fire training built soldiers' trust and confidence in their abilities which was a significant combat multiplier.

Most commanders cited training at the National Training Center, the Combined Maneuver Training Center, and Joint Readiness Training Center as instrumental to honing warfighting skills. Commanders reported that the Combat Training Centers provided combat leadership training at all levels. Rotations at the Combat Training Centers schooled leaders in where to position on the battlefield, the orders process, effects of extended operations, fire discipline, fire distribution, and the synchronization of fires. These are just a few of the many areas that commanders commented on when discussing the value of the Combat Training Centers. It was stated that Combat Training Centers should remain a training focus.

In summary, the Army's training doctrine works. The schoolhouse, individual and collective training at home station, and collective

training at company and battalion at the Combat Training Centers proved essential. Clearly, those are the cornerstones of the training system which produced victory in Panama and the Persian Gulf.

DOCTRINE

Both JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM demonstrated that the Army's warfighting doctrine is sound. LTC Gregory Fontenot, Cdr, 2-34 Ar, 1st Bde, 1ID, DESERT STORM, put it this way about the current warfighting doctrine, *"I believe our doctrine contributed immeasurably to our success in DESERT STORM. From the time of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, the Army has thought about doctrine, tactics, and techniques and trained to implement that doctrine. By the 1980s, we understood how to fight and honed those skills in the field and at the Combat Training Centers. What resulted from thinking and discussing doctrine and training hard with good equipment was the destruction of the Iraqi Army in four days."*

Training and operational doctrine developed in the 1970s and 1980s proved effective in combat during JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Tactics and techniques developed in unit training at local





training areas and at the Combat Training Centers were mastered by units and leaders who were motivated by the Army ethos. Their experiences in Panama and the Gulf confirmed the view that their preparation for war had been sound. Their greatest legacy may be their own conviction to do the same for their successors.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Battalion and company sized units in the future can expect to be given a wider variety of missions under a broader range of circumstances and environments than ever before in the history of the United States Army. The lessons and experiences of those leaders over the two most recent conflicts contained in this pamphlet are in essence timeless despite the revolutionary change being experienced by today's leaders and soldiers. They are relevant to future warfighting challenges or operations other than war. Past is prologue; trust, discipline, unit cohesion, soldier esprit, dynamic and decisive leadership are keys to unit success in the future, in all types of operations, as they always have been.

Commanders' Observations

Our training program for commanders is right on the mark. The Pre-Command Courses and the Tactical Commanders Development Course are teaching the right things. The FORSCOM Leaders Training Program is another excellent training exercise for commanders and leaders.

LTC David Jensen
Cdr, 3-7 In, 1st Bde, 24ID
DESERT STORM

The tank company doctrine on how to fight is sound. We studied the company and platoon manuals and checklists. They worked for us. We didn't get creative, we trained to the standards in the manuals.

CPT Bart Howard
Cdr, A Co, 3-67 Ar, Tiger Brigade
DESERT STORM

The quality of our disciplined soldiers is our greatest asset. Our soldiers can think on their feet, can grasp the commander's intent, and be trusted to make the right decisions in the absence of orders.

CPT Doug Thorp
Cdr, B Co, 4-17 In, 3rd Bde, 7ID
JUST CAUSE

The most important thing I learned at the Infantry Officer Advanced Course was the orders process. The process of commander's intent, execution, how it's all put together, and practicing it all the time is very important.

CPT Dana J. H. Pittard
Cdr, D Co, 1-37 Ar, 3rd Bde, 1AD
DESERT STORM

Summary

By its very nature, combat at battalion level and below is clouded in the fog and friction of war. Not everything goes according plan—mistakes are made. Battlefield success at the cutting edge ultimately results from detailed planning, thorough training, and violent execution.

Command and leadership during combat is not an exact science with formulas and solutions that apply for every situation. However, through the battlefield lenses of successful battalion and company commanders, several techniques and principles seem to apply.

Successful units possess a strong sense of trust and confidence—confidence in each other and confidence in their leaders. Trust and confidence build teamwork and cohesion—the core of all successful units. Discipline, strict adherence to standards, and decentralized execution also characterize successful units. Soldiers want to belong to a good unit and expect a disciplined organization which trains to meet or exceed the standard. Decentralization must be trained in peacetime if it is to be effective in war. The fight is won at the squad and platoon levels and junior leaders must be confident in their ability to make decisions and lead soldiers in combat.

As the external circumstances in which America's Army operates continue to change, battalion and company sized units will execute a broader range of missions than ever before. From disaster relief at home to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions abroad, small unit leaders will be called upon on short notice to deploy and protect our nation's vital interests. Despite the complexities of war and our rapidly changing world, the lessons and experiences of the leaders highlighted in this pamphlet underscore the one unchanging requirement for success on future battlefields—trained and ready teams built upon the character and discipline of the individual American soldier.

Appendixes

Appendix A—Bullet Comments of Trends

- Preparation for Combat
- Conducting the Fight
- Proven Successful Leadership Techniques
- Maintaining the Edge

Appendix B—Lessons Learned

Appendix C—Survey

Appendix D—Commanders

Appendix A

Bullet Comments of Trends

[redacted]

- **Tough, realistic training conducted to exacting standards builds *teamwork* and *cohesion*.**
- **Teamwork and cohesion build *trust* and *confidence* among soldiers and leaders.**
- **A clear understanding of the commander's intent is a requirement for planning and preparing for combat operations.**
- **Commander's intent allows subordinates to make decisions in the absence of orders.**
- **Senior leaders within the unit should be included in the planning process as time and availability permit.**

- **Briefbacks allow commanders to come to an agreement on the intent and execution of the plan.**

- **Rehearsals ensure the plan will work and verify the players' knowledge of their respective parts in the plan.**

- **During rehearsals, leaders should consider what is the worst thing that could happen and develop a course of action to meet that threat.**

- **At battalion and company level, contingencies are executed as drills.**

- **Drills and SOPs enable commanders to command effectively because they assure similar responses to similar conditions.**

- **If time permits, orders should be given face-to-face at a forward location with an immediate briefback.**
- **The warning order is a valuable tool in the orders process and keeps subordinate leaders from wasting time.**
- **Proficiency in drills and SOPs enable units to react quickly to changes.**
- **Crosstalk and eavesdropping are critical to the rapid orders process.**
- **Commanders should position themselves forward to see the battlefield, feel the intensity of the fight, and control fires.**
- **Commanders should not spend their energy acquiring targets and engaging the enemy, but should concentrate on controlling fires for their unit.**

- **Executive officers can effectively track the battle and sustainment, maintain communications with higher, run the orders process, and function as second in command.**

- **Commanders cannot do everything themselves. They must rely on other personnel in key positions to assist them with the control of the battle.**

- **Commanders can rely on command sergeants major and first sergeants for their increased experience and their perspective of soldiers' morale.**

- **Commanders, command sergeants major, and first sergeants must be visible to their soldiers during combat.**

- **Commanders must train decentralized execution in peace if it is to be effective in war.**
- **Pre-Combat Inspections establish standards for readiness.**
- **There is no initiative in drills and load plans; it's strictly compliance.**
- **Units must have a fire distribution plan with all weapons systems available to effectively mass fires on the enemy.**
- **Positive identification, fire discipline, and situational awareness are keys to preventing fratricide.**

- **Positive identification must be made before friendly forces engage the enemy. Units may have to sacrifice time and standoff distance to prevent fratricide.**

- **Company commanders can reserve the right to clear fires before their platoons engage.**

- **Commanders must know the location of their units as well as the status and position of adjacent forces.**

- **Orders given in a clear, calm voice during battle are more readily understood and decrease the confusion during combat.**

- **Character and discipline are the touchstones that guide leaders and soldiers through the rigors of combat.**

- **The success in combat of many commanders is largely attributed to the mentors who had taken them aside, trained them, and instilled a strong sense of military values.**

- **Leaders must be dedicated to their soldiers and their units.**

- **Leaders' responsibility is exhibited by caring for soldiers and developing a thorough training program that builds tough, excellent soldiers and molds them into fighting units.**

- **Soldiers expect a disciplined environment. Soldiers want to belong to a good unit.**

- **Soldiers and units will perform in combat only as well as they have performed in training.**

- **Soldiers must have confidence in their leaders or they won't take the risks necessary to win on the battlefield.**

- **Live fire training increases soldiers' confidence in themselves, their peers, and in their unit.**

- **The schoolhouse, unit, individual and collective training at home station, and leader training at the CTCs are producing commanders who are doing the right things in combat.**

- **The Army's doctrine is sound and worked in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.**

- **The lessons and experiences of leaders in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM are relevant to future warfighting challenges and operations other than war.**

Appendix B

Lessons Learned

What mistakes do you think you made during the preparation for combat and during the fight? What can we do to prevent future leaders from making these same mistakes?

All commanders were asked this question. The following is a synopsis of the most common answers.

... I made the mistake of being too close and involved in the action in front of me and temporarily lost sight of the bigger picture. I focused on the guys who were surrendering and lost sight of the others who had not quit.

... I would not get so caught up in the fight in front of me and stay more in tune with what the brigade and the rest of my task force was doing.

... I got too involved with the fighting and quit reading the battlefield. I should have anticipated the enemy's movements and made tactical decisions much sooner which would have facilitated his destruction or surrender.

... We had some accidental discharges. What it stressed to me is that leaders can never get comfortable. Commanders must continue to stress standards and leader involvement in everything the unit is doing.

... Commanders must guard against allowing their personal interaction with soldiers to hinder enforcement of discipline and standards. Our leaders were living with soldiers and the temptation was there to become sympathetic with soldiers' appeals to relax the standards, for instance, discipline, uniform, and personal hygiene.

... We didn't do well with analyzing the intelligence we were getting. The troop/company commanders only reported that they were killing the enemy and hordes more of them were coming. Out of the seven battle operating systems, I only worry about three—maneuver, indirect fire support and air, and intelligence. Of those three, the intelligence part is probably the portion in which we did the least well.

... We got too involved with killing the enemy and didn't realize we were destroying the security forces for a much larger force. We failed to recognize the template of the number and type of vehicles we were engaging before we hit the main body.

... I would encourage every commander to work closely with his S2 and make sure attention is paid to every intelligence summary that comes in.

... I'm not sure I talked with my second-in-charge or the chain of command enough on what would happen if I went down. In addition, I should have built more depth in key positions of the unit.

Appendix C

Survey

PREPARATION

1. How long had you previously known or worked with the leaders in your command? Did this affect the means or method of passing orders or intent?

2. Did you incorporate ideas or suggestions from your subordinates into the operation plan? How did you receive their input? (Orders briefs, briefbacks, rehearsals, etc...)

3. Did you or the staff conduct contingency planning?

4. How much time did your unit have to rehearse the operation? Who attended the rehearsals?

5. What specific drills did your unit train to during preparation for combat? Did your unit execute any of these drills during the fight?

6. Did you have the opportunity to backbrief the commander two levels up during the preparation? Did your plan change due to this briefing?

7. Did you understand your commander's intent? Did you understand the commander's intent two echelons higher?

COMBAT

8. What method did you rely on to pass orders to your commanders or platoon leaders during combat?

9. Explain how you used the orders process during combat?

10. Where did you position yourself on the battlefield during combat? What factors influenced this decision? Where did you position yourself during critical phases of combat, i.e., passage of lines, battle handoff, air insertion, etc?

11. Who were the indispensable people in your command who facilitated your ability to command on the battlefield?

12. Who did you insist stay close by or within voice distance during combat?

13. Did you ever talk to soldiers or leaders two echelons below your level during combat? Not necessarily for command and control, but to get his perspective of the fight?

14. What was the most effective means of distributing changes to graphics during combat?

15. What method was used to inform the main command post or TAC, of orders and intent issued to commanders while you were away from these nodes?

16. What was your unit's plan for fire distribution at battalion, company, and platoon level?

17. How did you train vehicle identification, friend or foe? What measures where taken within your unit, if any, to prevent fratricide?

SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES

18. What was the most successful leadership or command technique used during the fight? The least successful?

19. What would you do differently now in regards to commanding your organization during combat?

20. What mistakes do you think you made during the preparation for combat and during the fight? What can we do to prevent future leaders from making these same mistakes?

21. Is there anything left out in this survey about leadership on the battlefield that you wish to add?

Appendix D

Commanders

COL Gregory Fontenot. Commanded 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from April 1989 to June 1991. Commanded 2-34 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Harry B. Axson. Commanded 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division from April 1989 to May 1991. Commanded 2-504 Infantry Battalion during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM.

LTC Johnny Brooks. Commanded 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light) from April 1989 to May 1991. Commanded 4-17 Infantry Battalion during Operation JUST CAUSE.

LTC Bantz J. Craddock. Commanded 4th Battalion, 64th Armor, 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division from May 1989 to July 1991. Commanded 2-64 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Edward L. Dyer. Commanded 1st Battalion, 37th Armor, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division from June 1990 to June 1992. Commanded 1-37 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC William C. Feyk. Commanded 4th Battalion, 70th Armor, 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division from June 1989 to June 1991. Commanded 4-70 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Larry R. Gordon. Commanded 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 2nd Brigade, 24th Infantry Division from June 1990 to June 1992. Commanded 1-64 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC David F. Gross. Commanded 3rd Battalion, 37th Armor, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from June 1990 to June 1992. Commanded 3-37 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Frank R. Hancock. Commanded 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from June 1990 to June 1992. Commanded 1-327 Infantry Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC John F. Kalb. Commanded 4th Battalion, 32nd Armor, 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division from July 1989 to November 1991. Commanded 4-32 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Michael Kobbe. Commanded 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, VII Corps from September 1989 to September 1991. Commanded 2/2 ACR during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC David P. Jensen. Commanded 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division from August 1989 to August 1991. Commanded 3-7 Infantry Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Henry L. Kinnison IV. Commanded 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) from July 1990 to July 1992. Commanded 1-187 Infantry Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Michael L. McGee. Commanded 6th Battalion, 6th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division from January 1989 to November 1991. Commanded 6-6 Infantry Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Michael W. Parker. Commanded 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from June 1990 to June 1992. Commanded 1-5 Cavalry during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC James W. Reed. Commanded 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from December 1989 to November 1991. Commanded 4-6 Infantry Battalion during Operation JUST CAUSE.

LTC Timothy J. Reischl. Commanded 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division from June 1989 to July 1991. Commanded 4-67 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC G. Patrick Ritter. Commanded 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from June 1990 to June 1992. Commanded 1-34 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Charles Thomas Rogers. Commanded 1st Battalion, Staffordshire Regiment, 1st Armor Division, (United Kingdom) from October 1989 to November 1991. Commanded the 1st Battalion, Staffordshire Regiment during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM as part of VII Corps.

LTC Terry L. Tucker. Commanded 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 3rd Armored Division, VII Corps from June 1990 to June 1992. Commanded 4-7 Cavalry during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Douglas L. Tystad. Commanded 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor, Tiger Brigade from December 1988 to June 1991. Commanded during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Deployed with the 1st Cavalry Division to Saudi Arabia, attached to 2nd Marine Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Roy S. Whitcomb. Commanded 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor, 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division from July 1988 to July 1990. Commanded 2-70 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Jerry L. Wiedewitsch. Commanded 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division from July 1990 to November 1991. Commanded 1-36 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTC Robert Wilson. Commanded 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division, VII Corps from June 1990 to June 1992. Commanded 1-4 Cavalry during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

MAJ Joseph Anderson. Commanded Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment from June 1989 to November 1990. Commanded Bravo Company, 2-75 Rangers during Operation JUST CAUSE.

CPT Roger Alford. Commanded Alpha Company, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 1st Armored Division from May 1990 to October 1991. Commanded Alpha Company, 1-1 Cavalry during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Daniel B. Allyn. Commanded Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment from August 1988 to February 1990. Commanded Charlie Company, 1-75 Rangers during Operation JUST CAUSE.

CPT Michael A. Bills. Commanded Bravo Company, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division from April 1990 to September 1991. Commanded Bravo Company, 1-4 Cavalry during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Robert A. Burns. Commanded Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from May 1990 to December 1991. Commanded Charlie Company, 2-34 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT David L. Francavilla. Commanded Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from May 1990, to August 1991. Commanded Charlie Company, 1-5 Cavalry during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr. Commanded Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division from October 1989 to May 1991. Commanded Bravo Company, 3-7 Infantry Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Bart Howard. Commanded Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor, Tiger Brigade from March 1990 to June 1991. Commanded Bravo Company, 3-67 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Robert K. King. Commanded Delta Company, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division from June 1989 to March 1991. Commanded Delta Company, 4-67 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Michael L. Kirkton. Commanded Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from August 1990 to March 1992. Commanded Alpha Company, 1-5 Cavalry during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Michael S. McBride. Commanded Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) from December 1989 to August 1991. Commanded Bravo Company, 2-187 Infantry Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT H.R. McMaster, Jr. Commanded Echo Troop, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment from March 1990 to November 1991. Commanded Echo Troop, 2/2 ACR during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Dana J.H. Pittard. Commanded Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 37th Armor, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division from May 1990 to July 1991. Commanded Delta Company, 1-37 Armor Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Mark L. Ritter. Commanded Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment from September 1989 to April 1991. Commanded Alpha Company, 1-75 Rangers during Operation JUST CAUSE.

CPT Christopher J. Rizzo. Commanded Charlie Company, 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light) from June 1989 to December 1990. Commanded Charlie Company, 4-17 Infantry Battalion during Operation JUST CAUSE.

CPT Jeffrey R. Sanderson. Commanded Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division from October 1990 to June 1991. Commanded Charlie Company, 3-7 Infantry Battalion during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

CPT Douglas L. Thorp, Jr. Commanded Bravo Company, 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light) from October 1989 to February 1991. Commanded Bravo Company, 4-17th Infantry during Operation JUST CAUSE.

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T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: MacMillian Company, 1963), p. 233.